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INFORMATION PRIVACY AS A FUNCTION OF FACIAL RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY AND WEARABLE COMPUTERS
Woodrow Barfield1
ABSTRACT
As technological advances are made in the design of smart sensors, the issue of privacy in
public places, first discussed by Warren and Brandeis in 1890, becomes an important
topic for law and policy. This paper examines issues of privacy that are impacted when
an individual’s image is recorded by a video-based wearable computer, analyzed using
facial recognition software, and uploaded to the internet. While the Constitutional basis
of search and seizure law for individual’s placed under video surveillance is reviewed, a
particular focus of the paper is on a less investigated but emerging area of concern, the
video recording and facial recognition of individuals in public places by non-government
actors. The paper presents an overview of the law as applied to the use of video systems
for surveillance, reviews facial recognition techniques, and discusses cases arising under
state law dealing with video recording of individuals in public places. The paper
concludes with recommendations for the protection of privacy calling for the legislation
enactment of an information privacy statute to cover the disclosure of private information
for individuals filmed by wearable computers equipped with facial recognition software.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines privacy issues that occur when video-based wearable

computer systems equipped with facial recognition software are used to film an
individual in a public place. Video-based wearable computers pose a significant threat to
an individual’s privacy- not only can wearable computers with facial recognition
software record and analyze a person’s face, they can be used to upload an image to the
internet where it may be viewed by anyone with access to a computer and internet
connection. Once the identity of a person is known, information about the person that is
accessible on the internet can be presented with the individual’s face.2 The ability to film,
identify, and track an individual within a public place, along with the ability to pair
personal information to an individual’s image, has prompted some legal scholars into
calling for a new statute, covering information privacy, to provide relief for people who
have had their privacy violated by computing and communications technology.3
The Supreme Court has broadly defined privacy as “the individual’s control of
information concerning his or her person,” that is, the right to control the dissemination
of information about oneself.4 Similarly, information privacy involves an individual's
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See generally Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193
(1998); Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 93 (2005). Once an individual’s image is identified and uploaded to the internet, various items of
personal information available on computer databases can be pieced together, resulting in a
comprehensive picture of an individual.
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Kang, id. (discussing the concept of an information privacy statute).
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U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989).
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personal information and his ability to control that information.5 The basic argument for
information privacy stems from the concern that individuals have a right to exert some
control over who has access to their personal information, and for what purpose.6 As
expressed by a leading scholar on the topic, examples of personal information includes
data assigned to an individual, such as their social security number, address, or telephone
number; and information about an individual that is generated on a day-to-day basis, such
as records of bank transactions, credit card purchases, phone calls, and medical
treatments.7 Other personal information may be school or medical records, employment
histories, arrest records, and tracking information, as well as personal likes and dislikes.
Essentially, this collection of information not only defines who a person is but in many
cases describes the intimate details of a person’s life; therefore to allow such information
to be used without an individual’s consent, especially if paired to a person’s image posted
on the internet, would represent an unwarranted and unprecedented invasion into a
person’s privacy.
As society becomes dependent on computer databases and electronic recordkeeping, an individual's ability to control who has access to his personal information is
becoming even more tenuous.8 In the age of the internet and wirelessly networked
wearable computers, the inability to control the dissemination and use of personal
information gives rise to the issue of information privacy which may be exacerbated by
video-based systems with facial recognition software. Past thoughts on information
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See generally Kang, supra note 2; Kang & Cuff, supra note 2.
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Thomas Kearns, Technology and the Right to Privacy, The Convergence of Surveillance and Information
Privacy Concerns, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 975 (1999).
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privacy indicated that the concept was tied to the concept of anonymity,9 that is, the
control of personal information.10 It was not thought to address an individual's actions
and movements. However, since an individual’s image may be recorded as they move
about a public place, their identity known and analyzed as a result of facial recognition
software, and their image uploaded to the internet, this article argues for an expansion of
the concept of information privacy to include the actions and movements of an individual
when paired to the presentation of personal facts about the individual.
One concern resulting from the ability to identify a person and track their
movements using wearable computers is that a person’s right to freely travel and
associate may be severely impacted and curtailed. This is because an individual who
suspects that they are being filmed, and identified by strangers, may no longer feel free to
move through public places speaking with whom they wish and attending the meetings
that they wish.11 For instance, according to the Supreme Court, a woman has a protected
liberty interest in seeking an abortion,12 but this right is infringed upon when someone
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Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You’re On Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance, 31 Val.
U. L. Rev. 1079, 1125 (1997). Humans have a fundamental belief in the right to personal autonomy
which stems from dignity and individuality. When the sphere of autonomy is consistently violated, the
shell of humanity erodes.
10
Kang, supra note 2; Kang & Cuff, supra note 2.
11
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that a right to freedom of association and belief is implicit
in the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. This implicit right is limited to the right to associate for
First Amendment purposes. It does not include a right of social association. The government may
prohibit people from knowingly associating in groups that engage and promote illegal activities. The
right to associate also prohibits the government from requiring a group to register or disclose its members
or from denying government benefits on the basis of an individuals current or past membership in a
particular group. There are exceptions to this rule where the Court finds that governmental interests in
disclosure/registration outweigh interference with First Amendment rights. The government may also,
generally, not compel individuals to express themselves, hold certain beliefs, or belong to particular
associations or groups; see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
12
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). In Casey, the Court found it appropriate to allow information to be reported about the women
receiving abortions to state agencies, as long as the actual identity of the women remained confidential.
Id. at 900. However, by being able to film all women entering a clinic, identity is discernable and
capturable along with other potentially embarrassing personal information. Id.
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invades the woman's privacy by filming her entering a clinic from a superhuman vantage
point.13 The intrusion becomes even greater if the images are saved for some later
use.14 Once a person knows that when they enter a public place their image may be
recorded and analyzed, such knowledge may chill their desire to associate, especially
with causes that are counter to stated government policies; such a result would be a
severe blow to a democratic society. It seems intuitive that the law should recognize the
difference between being seen in public by someone with their naked eyes, versus being
filmed by unknown individuals using wearable computers and having their image
uploaded to the internet and identified by strangers.15 Given the capabilities of videobased wearable computer technology to film and track individuals, the law should
provide for the protection of an individual’s privacy when personal information about
that individual may be easily accessed on the internet and paired to the person’s image
posted on the internet.
As stated by several commentators, as society becomes more information-based,
and as more information about an individual is available on the internet; and as the need
for individuals to distribute their personal information increases;16 the need to protect
such personal information intensifies.17 This article reviews the privacy protection people
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See Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus, 14 Cal.App.4th. 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that
photographing and videotaping clients violated the right to privacy under the California Constitution);
Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 208 Cal.App.3d 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding an
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See generally Maureen O’Donnell, Cameras Around Every Corner, SUN-TIMES (Chi.), Feb. 18, 1996
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photographs of potential criminals, see Court Allows States To Throw The Book, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/05/supremecourt/main542863.shtml (last visited Jan. 27,
2006).
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See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for
Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 989, 1041 (1995).
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Kang, supra note 2; Kang & Cuff, supra note 2.
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may expect to receive under current law when their image may be recorded, analyzed,
and posted on the internet, and when they may be tracked in public places by individuals
using wearable computer technology. The article concludes that the current law is
insufficient to protect the privacy of individuals in the age of wirelessly networked
wearable computers equipped with facial recognition software. As a result, the article
calls for an expansion of the concept of an information privacy statute as expressed by
Professor Kang,18 and for legislative action at the state or federal level to enact a
comprehensive statute which would protect the information privacy rights of individuals
in public places.
EARLY THOUGHTS ON PRIVACY
In the classic article by Warren and Brandeis on privacy written in 1890, the
proposition that privacy was a basic right was introduced.19 After exploring the nature
and scope of the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis concluded that "it is the
unwarranted invasion of individual privacy which is reprehended, and to be, so far as
possible, prevented."20 Now days at the bank or at the mall,21 on the highway,22 at a
grocery store,23 at a sports event,24 or even walking down a street,25 an individual’s
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Kang, supra note 2.
Samuel Warren & Louis, D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); but see Richard
C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional
Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 479, 482 n.5 (1990) (indicating that a 1881
Michigan case and other sources discussed the right to privacy prior to the publication of the Warren &
Brandeis article).
20
Warren & Brandeis, id. at 215.
21
Marcus Nieto, Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention Tool? Available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05/ (last visited Jan, 26, 2006).
22
See generally Woodrow Barfield & Thomas Dingus (eds.) Human Factors in Intelligent Vehicle
Highway Systems (Lawrence Erlbaum Press, 1997).
23
State v. Dunn, Slip Copy, Tenn.Crim.App., 2004 Tenn.Crim.App LEXIS 854 (2004) (defendant pled
guilty to theft from a grocery store, the crime was recorded with a video camera which showed the
defendant loading shopping carts full of groceries and leaving the store without paying); see State v.
James, Minn.App. LEXIS 1155 (Minn.App. 2004) (evidence of the robbery of a convenience store was
based on sister’s identification from surveillance video).
19
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privacy can be severely compromised as they are unknowingly filmed by a host of video
cameras, some containing facial recognition software.26
Since the Warren and Brandeis article was first written, the technology which can
be used to capture a person’s image, track their movements, and therefore intrude upon
their privacy has improved dramatically. One significant difference regarding video
technology today compared to just a few years ago, is that once an individual’s image is
recorded, it can be subjected to analysis by facial recognition software and compared to
millions of images stored in government and private databases.27 That is, facial
recognition technology28 coupled with video cameras can be used to take pictures of
individuals in a crowd which can then be compared to the facial features of known
individuals, using standard biometric measurements. With video-based wearable
computers, no longer will an individual be able to move within a public place with some
degree of anonymity, instead once they are filmed, they can be subjected to analysis by
facial recognition software and identified, thus losing any anonymity they may have had.
In addition, once an individual’s image is captured using video cameras, the image can be
manipulated in various ways; for example, it is relatively easy to insert a digital image
into film, video, or a picture in such as way as to create a false or misleading impression
24

Jack Carey, USA TODAY, ACLU Protests High-tech Super Bowl Surveillance, 02/06/2002, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-02-02-super-bowl-surveillance.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2006).
25
Steve Mann, Sousveillance and Cyborglobs: A 30 year Empirical Voyage Through Ethical, Legal, and
Policy Issues, 14 Presence: Telerobotics and Virtual Environments 625 (2005).
26
A person may be filmed at a border entry by a government agency, or by a non-governmental actor such
as the owner of a store at a mall, or by an employer at a workplace. But the fact that a person may be
“surveilled” by a non-government source may not mean that the individual’s image is not accessible by
the government, as the state can buy or subpoena private data, Kang & Cuff, supra note 2, at 127; see
also http://www.law.ucla.edu/kang/gigs/iLaw%202004%20privacy/politics.html#Topic69 (last visited
Jan. 26, 2005).
27
In the government context, the IRS may be interested in viewing the video of a tax delinquent making a
large consumer purchase.
28
See generally Ric Simmons, The Powers and Pitfalls of Technology: Technology-Enhanced Surveillance
by Law Enforcement Officials, 60 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 711 (2005).
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that a particular person was at a particular place at a particular time.29 This illustrates the
point that video images can be used for purposes far beyond the individual’s original
consent, if consent were given at all.
Based on the pervasiveness of video equipment, the relevant question to ask is
not: Am I being filmed?30 Instead, the relevant question to ask is: Who is doing the
filming, and what is being done with my image? These questions are timely given the
increased technological capabilities to film individuals in public places, analyze their
faces using software, transmit that person’s image using the internet to anywhere in the
world, and track their movements. Video technology with facial recognition software,
combined with the ability to search the internet for personal information about an
individual, along with the ability to track an individuals movements in public places, all
combine to threaten an individuals privacy in ways well beyond that discussed by Warren
and Brandeis31 when they called for new law to account for privacy violations resulting
from recent technology advances.
II. WEARABLE COMPUTERS
The type of wearable computer that is the focus of this article consists of a small
portable computer worn on the body which contains a miniature camera for video

29

Seanna Browder, Now, The Cops are Strapping on Computers, Bus. Wk., July 13, 1998, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/1998/28/b3586110.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006) (reporting field-testing
in three cities of lightweight wearable computers for use in police investigation; computers are equipped
with digital cameras and laser range finders for recording crime-scene data).
30
In the context of privacy rights in the information age, it is interesting to note the sentiment expressed by
Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems, in a question posed to him about online privacy he answered:
"You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it," available at
http://www.techcentralstation.com/051500C.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
31
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19.
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capture, a head-worn display,32 input device, and a wireless internet connection. The
main benefit of a wearable computer is that it allows an individual to access information
at any time and any place.33 Wearable computers are especially useful for applications
that require computational support while the user's hands, voice, eyes or attention are
actively engaged with the physical environment. Depending on the application, the
primary input to a wearable computer might be a chording keyboard, gesture, or speech
recognition. There are different kinds of technology that may be considered a wearable
computer, for example, a watch containing a calculator is a wearable computer as is a
portable GPS unit. However, only some forms of wearable computers pose a threat to an
individual’s privacy- essentially those that contain a video camera or those that track a
person’s location.
The internet combined with advances in wearable-computer technologies, makes
the comments of Warren and Brandeis on the unwarranted invasion of an individual’s
privacy even more applicable to current times.34 With wearable computing technology,35
a person walking down the street can unknowingly have their image captured by a
miniature video camera worn by another person, and through a wireless network, have
their facial image appear on the stranger’s web page accessible to millions, all without
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Wearable computers are often integrated into the user's clothing or can be attached to the body through
some other means, like a wristband. They may also be integrated into everyday objects that are
constantly worn on the body, like a hands-free cell phone.
33
See generally Steve Mann & Woodrow Barfield, Introduction to Mediated Reality, 15 International
Journal of Human-Computer Interaction 2 (2003) (discussing the promise of wearable computers and
mediated reality).
34
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19.
35
Steve Mann, Wearable, Tetherless Computer—Mediated Reality: WearCam as a Wearable FaceRecognizer, and Other Applications for the Disabled, available at http://wearcam.org/vmp.htm (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006). Edward O. Thorp, The Invention of the First Wearable Computer, available at
(http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?isnumber=15725&amp;arnumber=729523&amp;count=3
0&amp;index=1) (last visited Jan. 26, 2006), also in The Second International Symposium on Wearable
Computers: Digest of Papers, IEEE Computer Society, 4-8 (1998).
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their knowledge or express consent.36 A video-based wearable computer that is wirelessly
networked poses new and compelling privacy concerns for individuals in public places
and raises a host of legal questions; for example, does an individual have a right to
consent to their image being filmed and subjected to analysis by facial recognition
software; and does a person have a right to stop an individual from posting their image on
the internet?
Due to the invasiveness of facial recognition software coupled with the video
capability of wearable computers, some technologists have argued for the creation of
privacy faces, which could be emitted electronically by any individual with the
appropriate technology.37 The use of a privacy face would allow only certain types of
data for a particular individual to be accessible by another’s computing system.38 The use
of such technology represents a technological solution to the problem of having an image
recorded and uploaded to the internet without consent, but such a solution is inapplicable
to the vast majority of people who enter public places without the aid of technological
devices to protect their privacy.
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND DATABASES
One threat to an individual’s privacy is the fact that the use of facial recognition
software, in combination with wider use of video surveillance, may grow increasingly
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See generally Woodrow Barfield, Steve Mann, Kevin Baird, Francine Gemperle, Chris Kasabach, John
Stivoric, Malcolm Bauer & Richard Martin, Computational Clothing and Accessories, in Fundamentals
of Wearable Computers and Augmented Reality, Woodrow Barfield & Thomas Caudell (eds.) (Elsevier
Press 2001). See also J. Spence (dissent) in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal.2d 224, 227 (1953)
(arguing that placing oneself in the public view does not mean consenting to your image being observed
by millions.)
37
Kang, supra note 2; Kang & Cuff, supra note 2, at 136-137; see, e.g., Scott Lederer, Anind K. Dey &
Jenifer Mankiff, Everyday Practices in Ubiquitous Computing Environments, available at
http://guir.berkeley.edu/pubs/ubicomp2002/privacyworkshop/papers/lederer-ubicomp
02-workshop.pdf (discussing the use of privacy faces) (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
38
Kang & Cuff, id. at 136.
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invasive over time. In theory, a positive benefit of wearable computer systems combined
with video is to allow law enforcement to scan through thousands of faces in a crowd and
then alert officers to the presence of any known fugitives that might be present. However,
once installed, a video surveillance system rarely remains confined to its original
purpose, and instead often expands in ways that threatens privacy. As new ways of using
video surveillance and facial recognition systems suggest themselves, the authorities or
operators of such systems may find them to be an irresistible expansion of their power,
and if so, citizens' privacy may suffer. The end result of abuses of power is the threat that
widespread use of video cameras may change the character, feel, and quality of American
life itself.39 Abuses of power associated with the use of video systems and databases may
not be confined solely to “powers of authority,” private citizens in possession of such
technology may also use the technology to invade an individual’s privacy and access
personal information about that person. A later section of this article will discuss such
abuses in the context of video voyeurism and reality filming.40
One problem with online databases is that they can be accessed by hackers and
thieves, with resulting breaches in privacy to individuals and database owners. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission recently required that data warehouser
ChoicePoint Inc. pay a fine to settle charges that its security and record-handling
procedures violated consumers' privacy rights and federal laws.41 ChoicePoint collects
data on individuals, including Social Security numbers, real estate holdings and current
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What's Wrong With Public Video Surveillance? Available at
http://aolsvc.weather.aol.com/main.adp?location=USNC0120 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
40
Infra sections VI and VII.
41
FTC Hits ChoicePoint With a $15 Million Fine, available at
http://articles.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20060126095809990009&_mpc=news%2e10%2e4&cid
=403 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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and former addresses. It has about 19 billion records, and its customers include insurance
companies, financial institutions and federal, state and local agencies.42 Choicepoint
revealed that its massive database of consumer information was accessed by thieves
posing as small business customers. The Federal Trade Commission said it fined the
company ten million dollars, the biggest fine the agency had ever imposed, and that
Choicepoint would be required to pay an additional five million dollars to compensate
consumers.43 The Federal Trade Commission indicated that "The message to ChoicePoint
and others should be clear: Consumers' private data must be protected from thieves."44
The settlement requires ChoicePoint to implement new procedures to ensure that it
provides consumer reports only to legitimate businesses for lawful purposes, to establish
and maintain a comprehensive information security program and to obtain audits by an
independent third-party security professional every other year until 2026.45 This example
illustrates the difficulty of keeping an online database secure, and that information that is
highly private and sensitive may be accessed by hackers and thieves, and may ultimately
end up for sale to the highest bidder.
Another concern associated with video-based wearable computers and databases
relates to an aspect of human nature. As video camera systems are operated by persons,
they bring to the technology all their existing prejudices and biases. In Great Britain, for
example, camera operators have been found to focus disproportionately on people of
color, and the mostly male operators frequently focus voyeuristically on women.46 Even

42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Electronic Privacy Information Center, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/ (last
visited Jan. 26, 2006).
43
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though video surveillance by the police isn't as widespread in the U.S., as Great Britain,
an investigation by the Detroit Free Press still shows the kind of abuses that can happen.47
Looking at how a database available to Michigan law enforcement was used, the
newspaper found that officers had used it to help their friends or themselves stalk women,
threaten motorists, track estranged spouses - even to intimidate political opponents.48
According to one commentator, the unavoidable conclusion is that the more people who
have access to a database, the more likely that there will be abuse.49 Facial recognition
technology is especially subject to abuse because it can be used in a passive way that
doesn't require the knowledge, consent, or participation of the subject50 and once an
image is an a database, it can be used in a way that far exceeds the original purpose of
creating the database. According to one commentator, the creation of a database multiples
the effects of sensors.51 For example, video cameras have a far less intrusive effect on
privacy if their only use is to be monitored in real time by a person. However, the longer
the tapes are archived the greater their potential effect, and the more the tapes can be
indexed according to who and what they show rather than just where and when they were
made.52 Further, the greater the amount of information about an individual that is placed
in a database, the greater the danger that personal information and facts about the person
may appear with the person’s image on the internet resulting in a level of intrusion into

47

M. L. Elrick, Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Misuse Among Police
Frequent, Say Some, but Punishments Rare, July 31, 2001, available at
http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1461 (2000).
52
Id.
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the private affairs of an individual, unknown before recent times.53
SOUSVEILLENCE
In response to the use of video cameras by authority figures to place individuals
under surveillance or to film a person as they move around public spaces, is the idea that
individuals may protect their privacy by “filming the filmers.”54 The term
“sousveillance”55 refers both to the concept of inverse surveillance (filming the filmers),
as well as to the recording of an activity from the perspective of a participant in the
activity.56 An example of the latter idea is the use of phone cameras for what some have
termed “citizen journalism.”57 On this point, consider George Holiday’s videotape of Los
Angeles police officers beating of Rodney King.58 Another illustration of the recording of
an activity from the individual’s perspective comes from recent news headlines. After the
terrorists bombing of the London subway which occurred July 21, 2005 some of the first
video from the scene was from subway riders who filmed the scene with their phone
cameras.

53

The Total Information Awareness (TIA) program was a government program designed to mine data in
commercial as well as government databases to spot patterns that could indicate terrorist activity.
Hiawatha Bray, Mining Data to Fight Terror Stirs Privacy Fears, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 3, 2003, at
C2, available at 2003 WL 3388980. Although Congress eliminated funding for TIA, similar efforts
continue, see Duane D. Stanford, ACLU Attacks Matrix on Privacy, available at
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/1003/31matrix.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (describing an
initiative by several state governments to develop a program similar to TIA, the Multistate AntiTerrorism Information Exchange (Matrix)), available at 2003 WL 66525863.
54
See generally Mann, supra note 25; Howard Kleinberg, Video Cameras Turn the Tables on Big Brother,
L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 22, 1991, at 6 (claiming that we are a society that has become accustomed to
instant replay).
55
Mann, id, sousveillance is derived from inverse surveillance, taken from the French "sous" for "below",
plus "veiller" for "to watch."
56
Id.
57
Paul J. Gough & Chris Marlowe, Cell Phone Video First from London Bombing Scene, WEB/NEW
MEDIA: News, July 8, 2005, available at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/new_media/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000975698 (last
visited Jan. 6, 2006).
58
Katherine Fulton, The Anxious Journey of a Technophobe, Columbia Journalism Review, available at
http://archives.cjr.org/year/93/6/technophobe.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2006); see also Rodney King and
the Los Angeles Riots, available at http://www.citivu.com/ktla/sc-ch1b.html (last visited Jan 26, 2006).
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From the community that advocates “shooting back,” as a response to video
surveillance, has come the term “inverse surveillance” which is used to refer to the
recording or monitoring of a real or apparent authority figure by others, particularly those
who are generally the subject of surveillance.59 Inverse surveillance is therefore
considered a type of sousveillance.60 According to Professor Mann, an example of
inverse surveillance in the auditory domain occurs when one or more parties to a
conversation record it, which represents an act of sousveillance; whereas when the
conversation is recorded by a person who is not a party to the conversation, such a
recording may be termed "surveillance."61 Audio sousveillance is allowed in most
states,62 and by Federal law63 but audio surveillance is illegal in most states.64
Some commentators argue that sousveillance, to some extent, reduces or
eliminates the need for surveillance.65 They argue that in this sense it is possible to
replace the Panoptic God's eye view of surveillance with a more community-building
ubiquitous personal experience capture.66 In their view, crimes, for example, might be
solved by way of collaboration among the citizenry equipped with video cameras rather
than through the watching over the citizenry from above.67 However, even with the

59

Steve Mann, who coined the term souesveillance, describes it as "watchful vigilance from underneath."
In contrast, surveillance denotes the "eye-in-the-sky" watching from above; whereas sousveillance
denotes bringing the camera or other means of observation down to the human level, see Mann, supra
note 25.
60
“Hierarchical sousveillance" refers, for example, to citizens photographing police, shoppers
photographing shopkeepers, or taxicab passengers photographing cab drivers, see generally Mann, supra
note 25
61
Id. at 635.
62
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proposed benefits of filming those that place individual citizens under surveillance,
comes the risk of invading the privacy of other individuals not expecting to be filmed,
this raises the fundamental questions of whether those engaged in sousveillance are
simply replacing one filmer with another and whether by advocating the wearing of video
cameras for the citizenry, we are building a society where every action by every
individual is filmed- creating a society with zero privacy.
III.

FACIAL RECOGNITION BIOMETRICS
As the focus of this article is on privacy in public places as a function of facial

recognition software integrated into wearable computers, this section presents an
overview of facial recognition technology. Facial recognition systems are computer
programs that analyze images of human faces for the purpose of identifying them.68
Generally, the facial scans captured by video are converted into numerical codes that are
then stored and searched in databases.69 Facial recognition programs work by recording a
facial image, measuring facial characteristics, or landmarks, such as the distance between
the eyes, the length of the nose, and the angle of the jaw, and then creating a file called
either a "template" or “faceprint”70 Some facial software systems define these landmarks
as nodal points,71 and there are about 80 nodal points on a human face.72 These nodal
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points are measured by facial recognition systems to create a numerical code, a string of
numbers that represents the face in a database.73 Using templates, the software then
compares a recorded image with a stored image and produces a score that measures how
similar the images are to each other. Typical sources of images for use in facial
recognition systems include video camera images and pre-existing photos such as those
in driver's license databases.
The FaceIt facial recognition system which is a commercially available software
package used to capture and compare facial images, will be used as an exemplar to
describe how facial recognition systems operate in the field.74 When FaceIt is attached to
a video system, it searches the camera’s field of view for faces. An algorithm is used to
search for faces in low resolution.75 If there is a face in the view, it is detected within a
fraction of a second. The system switches to a high-resolution search only after a headlike shape is detected. A process termed “alignment” occurs once a face is detected and
the system determines the head's position, size and pose. A face needs to be turned at
some angle toward the camera, at least within 35 degrees for the version of FaceIt
discussed here, in order for the facial recognition system to register it. The process of
normalization occurs when the image of the head is scaled and rotated so that it can be
registered and mapped into an appropriate size and pose.76
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The heart of the FaceIt facial recognition system is the “local feature analysis
algorithm.”77 The algorithm represents the mathematical technique used by the system to
encode faces. The system maps the face and creates a faceprint, a unique numerical code
for that face. Once the system has stored a faceprint, it can compare it to the thousands or
millions of images stored in a database. According to one source, a facial recognition
system can match multiple images at a rate of 60 million per minute from memory or 15
million per minute from hard disk.78 As comparisons are made, the system assigns a
value to the comparison using a scale of one to 10; if a score is above a predetermined
threshold, a match is declared.
There are ongoing attempts to improve the accuracy of facial recognition
techniques.79 A recent advance in facial recognition systems is the use of the texture of
the skin to assist in identifying an individual.80 For example, using an algorithm called
surface texture analysis, the surface of the skin can be analyzed for random features
which results in a “skinprint,” or skin template.81 The skinprint can be used on its own to
recognize faces, or can be fused together with traditional facial or fingerprint biometric
techniques to increase the level of accuracy with current facial recognition systems.82
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LIMITATIONS OF FACIAL RECOGNITION SYSTEMS
It has been reported by some commentators that there are severe limitations
associated with facial recognition systems which itself brings up a host of legal issues.83
For example, inaccuracies in facial recognition systems may result in misidentification of
individuals or inaccurate or misleading information paired to a person’s picture posted on
the internet. One difficulty for facial recognition systems in that faces are highly complex
patterns that often differ in only subtle ways, and it is very difficult for a machine-based
system to match images when there are differences in lighting, camera, or camera angle
between recorded and stored images.84 There are also changes in the appearance of the
face itself that make identification of individuals difficult, that is, unlike our fingerprints
or irises, our faces do not stay the same over time. And facial recognition systems are
easily influenced by changes in hairstyle, facial hair, or body weight, by simple disguises,
and by the effects of aging.85
A study by the government's National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) found false-negative rates for face-recognition verification of 43 percent using
photos of subjects taken just 18 months earlier.86 The NIST study also found that a
change of 45 degrees in the camera angle rendered the software useless.87 Studies by
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NIST have shown that there are significant differences in facial matching abilities of
facial recognition systems, depending on whether the images were taken indoors or
outdoors.88 It has been reported that facial recognition performance for outdoor images is
only about half as good as for indoor images, where there is better control of lighting
conditions.89
Generally, facial recognition technology works best under tightly controlled
conditions, e.g., when the subject is staring directly into the camera under bright lights.
Grainy, dated video surveillance photographs of the type likely to be on file for many
individuals would be a poor template as a matching image. In addition, questions have
been raised about how well the software works on dark-skinned individuals, whose
features may not appear clearly on lenses optimized for light-skinned people. And finally,
differences in facial expressions, such as when an individual yawns, may affect the
accuracy of facial recognition systems.
IV.

FACIAL RECOGNITION VIDEO SYSTEMS IN USE
The need to know the specific identity of an individual is a recent development in

video surveillance and wearable computers and has led to the implementation of facial
recognition software in systems with video capabilities. There are many current uses of
facial recognition technologies coupled with wearable computers. For example, security
personnel in major U.S. airports may use wearable computers equipped with facial
recognition software so they can identify suspicious travelers.90 The goal of a wearable
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computer security system is to get local verification' of an individuals identity so that the
appropriate people at the terminal can get the information they need rapidly. Another
application of wearable computers equipped with facial recognition software is the “iCare
Interaction Assistant,” a device for helping individuals who are visually impaired.91 With
this system, facial recognition technology is used as a social interaction assistant to help
identify and interpret facial expressions, emotions and gestures and then communicate
that information to visually impaired individuals.92
After the terrorist’s attacks of 9-11,93 the U.S. government has been actively
investigating the use of biometric technologies94 including facial recognition software
that can potentially pick a suspected terrorist out of a crowded room.95 Through this
research agenda, the Department of Defense has been providing research funds to
universities, with the goal of identifying people in a variety of lighting and background
situations.96 The goal of one such research project, HumanID,97 is to develop automated
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biometric identification technologies to detect, recognize and identify humans at great
distances.98 The federally funded research is also aimed at developing the capability to
identify individuals based on their gait.99
Unlike other biometric systems, facial recognition can be used for general
surveillance, usually in combination with public video cameras. There have been several
such uses of facial recognition software in the United States thus far. One example is in
airports, where video systems with facial recognition capabilities have been adopted in
the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9-11.100 And in some U.S. cities, such as Virginia
Beach, Virginia, facial recognition technology has been implemented on public streets to
search for criminals.101 In addition, in England, where public, police-operated video
cameras are widespread, individual towns such as Newham and London have
experimented extensively with the technology.102
Most people are not aware of the pervasiveness and technological capabilities of
video systems coupled with facial recognition software.103 A recent field test of video-
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based surveillance highlights some of the capabilities and uses of video systems as
applied to the general public. In January 2001, roughly 100,000 ticket-holders viewed
the Super Bowl in Tampa, Florida. Secretly the police took pictures of every attendee as
they entered the stadium through the turnstiles and compared the recorded photographic
images against a database of some undisclosed kind; the recorded images were then
compared to the database using facial recognition software.104 The authorities would not
say who was in that database, but the facial recognition software was reported to flag 19
individuals.105 The police indicated that some of those were false alarms, and no one
flagged by the system was anything more than a petty criminal such as a ticket scalper.106
Facial recognition systems are also being tested and used at public schools.107 For
example, in Phoenix, Arizona, facial recognition technology designed to recognize
registered sex offenders and missing children has been installed at a school in a pilot
project.108 The video system installed at the school is linked to state and national
databases of sex offenders, missing children and alleged abductors.109 Using a wide-area
network, video images captured at the school are transferred to the local Sheriff's office,
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where facial recognition software110 is used to scan 28 facial features of the recorded
images in an effort to match them against images in databases containing missing
children, suspected child abductors and sexual predators. Supposedly, images not
matching the databases are immediately erased;111 however, the ability to recover images
erased from a computer hard drive, is a well-known technology and thus the storage of
facial images in any database as the public exercises their right to move freely within
public spaces is troublesome.
One of the most innovative uses of facial recognition is being employed by the
Mexican government, which is using the technology to weed out duplicate voter
registrations.112 To sway an election, people will register several times under different
names so they can vote more than once. Using facial recognition technology, officials can
search through facial images in the voter database for duplicates at the time of
registration.113 New images are compared to the records already on file to catch those
who attempt to register under aliases. The technology was used in the country's 2000
presidential election and is expected to be used in local elections as well.114 Other current
uses for facial recognition software is by casinos; law enforcement to digitalize mug
shots; welfare departments to look for double-dippers; drivers' license bureaus to reduce
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I.D. forgers; and ATMs to separate clients from thieves.115 Finally, a biometric security
plan being tested by NASA, would also allow engineers to control unmanned spacecraft
from their home computer, using both facial scanning and fingerprint readers.116
V.

PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF WEARABLE COMPUTERS
As noted, wearable computers equipped with video-based facial recognition

technology can be used to record and analyze a person’s face, track their movements, and
upload their image to the internet where personal information about the individual can be
paired to the recorded image; does such a use of the technology result in an invasion of
privacy under the current law?117 To answer this question, the article first discusses the
general concept of privacy, reviews Fourth Amendment law on search and seizure, and
presents case law relating to the filming of individuals in a public place.
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis were the first legal scholars to introduce a
comprehensive notion of a common-law right of privacy into American jurisprudence.118
However, although they were the first legal scholars to document a right of privacy,
privacy-related notions such as trespass, protecting property from invasion, and
individual protections in criminal law already existed as integral parts of early American
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law.119 Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as a right to "be let alone"120 and centered
their concern upon technological devices that existed in the 1890’s, especially
"instantaneous" photographs.121 In calling for new law to remedy invasions into people’s
privacy, Warren and Brandeis argued that "political, social, and economic" changes in
society required recognition of new rights and that the common law should adapt to
accommodate those societal needs.122 Now days, the development of wirelessly
networked wearable computers equipped with miniature cameras, may pose an equal if
not greater challenge to an individual’s right to privacy as did the use of still photographs
in the 1890’s. While in either case, an individual may be exposing their image to the
scrutiny of the general public when they enter a public place- the scope of the exposure,
the extended length of time an individual’s image may be recorded, the almost
instantaneous nature of posting the recorded image on the internet, the ability of software
to analyze the individual’s image, and the ability of software to search databases and
provide personal information about an individual- all represent a significant advance in
the ability of technology to invade a persons “right to be left alone” once they enter a
public place.
Interestingly, the United States Constitution contains no direct reference to a right
of privacy; but the High Court has held that such a fundamental right does exist. In
Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court stated that privacy was a
fundamental right established through the "zone of privacy" found within the Bill of
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Rights.123 Despite this concept of privacy, an individual’s right under the Constitution to
protect themselves from interested observers remains limited. In fact, early courts
initially declined to recognize the “right to be left alone” as expressed by Warren and
Brandeis.124 For example, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., the New York
Court of Appeals dismissed a suit for invasion of privacy by a woman whose picture was
placed on 25,000 poster’s advertising defendant’s flour without her consent.125 The court
failed to provide relief and declared that no right to privacy existed.126 In response to the
public outcry after Roberson, the New York legislature enacted section 51 of the Civil
Rights Law providing a cause of action for anyone whose name, portrait or picture was
used for advertising or for purposes of trade without written consent.127 A few years after
the Roberson case was decided, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Company, recognized a common law right to privacy where the
defendant published the plaintiff’s name and picture to advertise its insurance services
without the plaintiff’s consent.128 In the 1930s, most jurisdictions accepted a common-
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law right of privacy, and the first Restatement of Torts recognized this common-law right
in 1939.129
More recently, Professor Lawrence Tribe described the essence of an individual’s
right to privacy, the "right to be left alone," as "nothing less than society’s limiting
principle . . . . It is a right which has meaning only within the social environment from
which it would provide some degree of escape.”130 In 1960, Dean William Prosser
authored a seminal article on privacy that compiled a mixture of privacy tort cases
decided since the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article.131 In his influential
article, Prosser argued that the invasion of privacy tort, designed by Warren and
Brandeis, was actually comprised of four distinct categories of tort privacy.132 Prosser
labeled these torts as intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false
light, and appropriation.133 Drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts subsequently
incorporated Prosser's four privacy tort definitions into the Restatement's privacy
sections.134 Courts in most states have recognized Prosser's privacy torts, and many
courts have adopted language directly from the Restatement sections.135 In several
jurisdictions, courts have accepted the three privacy torts of intrusion upon seclusion,
public disclosure of private facts, and appropriation; however, some courts have excluded
129
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the tort of false light.136 Nearly every jurisdiction recognizes some form of a tortious right
of privacy.137
Prosser's review of intrusion upon seclusion case law revealed a variety of cases,
some allowing recovery for physical intrusion and others extending beyond physical
intrusion.138 According to Prosser, the privacy tort of intrusion overlapped with the torts
of trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress.139 Further, Prosser derived
two limiting factors from the case law that would separate tortious intrusion from nontortious intrusions.140 First, a reasonable person must find the intrusion offensive or
objectionable;141 second, the intrusion must be into something private in nature.142 Under
the second limiting factor, Prosser drew a strong distinction between protection in a
private location and a lack of protection in public spaces.143 The article explicitly stated
that taking a photograph of a person in a public place or on a public street would not
136
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qualify as actionable under the privacy tort of intrusion.144 In an age of wirelessly
networked wearable computers, would a court using the same principles as developed by
Prosser conclude that an image recorded in a public place, analyzed, and uploaded to the
internet was an invasion of privacy under the tort of intrusion? Clearly, since Prosser’s
seminal article was published, the ability of technology to invade a person’s privacy has
increased several fold, and in some cases the law on privacy has adapted to changes in
technology as witnessed by state and federal statutes,145 and state constitutions which
include a right to privacy.146 However, even with changes in the law designed to protect
an individual’s privacy under specific circumstances,147 the law has not adequately
changed to protect the privacy of individuals once they enter a public place in an age of
wirelessly networked, video-based, wearable computers- especially given that such
systems can be used to track an individuals movements and pair personal information
about an individual to their image posted on the internet.
Of significance to video-based wearable computers, was Prosser's conclusion that
there can be no intrusion of privacy in a public place; this conclusion rested on two
premises:148 (1) that a person effectively assumes a risk of scrutiny when entering a
public place;149 and (2) that there was no distinguishable difference between merely
observing a person and taking their photograph. However, recent technology may have
changed the premises under which Prosser concluded that an individual in a public place
may not claim a right of privacy from intrusion. For example, related to the first premise,
144
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given the ability of video-based wearable computers to record a person’s image, search
databases, and upload the person’s image to the internet, a danger associated with
networked wearable computers could be the pairing of inaccurate or highly personal
information to an individual’s image. Such a result could lead to a form of “digital
scarlet letter” attached to the individual’s image, accessible by millions on the internet.
Regarding Prosser’s second premise, video systems equipped with facial recognition
software and wireless internet access will allow far more to be known about an individual
than can be discerned by simply looking at a still photograph. That is, given the extensive
information about each person that is searchable on the internet, including medical and
financial records, phone records, biographical and family information, and employment
histories, the potential to know far more than just what a person presents to the public
when entering a public space is entirely possible once the person’s identity is known.
In an early case, decided well before wirelessly networked video-based wearable
computers were developed, the court in Gill v. Hearst Publishing150 provided support for
Prosser's conclusions regarding a lack of privacy in public places.151 This privacy case
arose when a photographer took a photograph of a couple in a romantic pose at the
Farmers' Market in Los Angeles.152 The couple asserted that the photograph published in
a magazine without their consent violated their right of privacy.153 The Gill court decided
that the couple waived their right of privacy when they voluntarily assumed an amorous
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pose in a public setting.154 Additionally, the court concluded that the photograph "did not
disclose anything which until then had been private, but rather only extended knowledge
of the particular incident to a somewhat larger public than had actually witnessed it at the
time of occurrence."155 Clearly the use of facial recognition software coupled with the
ability of a computing system to search vast databases almost instantaneously, and to pair
that information to a particular individual, goes far beyond the alleged invasion of
privacy considered by the Gill court and thus can be distinguished from the facts
presented in Gill. A court deciding whether an individual using a wearable computer
equipped with facial recognition software violates an individual’s privacy, may find the
increased intrusiveness of a wirelessly networked wearable computer with facial
recognition software actionable under tort law.
Prosser drew a similar distinction between public and private facts in his review
of the second privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts.156 The public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts, similar to intrusion, requires intrusion into something that is
secret, secluded, or private.157 Additionally, the disclosure tort measures the matter made
public using a reasonable person standard.158 In the case of wearable computers, would a
reasonable person expect when entering a public place that their image would be filmed
and uploaded to the internet viewable by millions of people around the world? And
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would a reasonable person expect that their image posted on the internet without their
consent would contain personal information?
On the issue of the reasonable person standard, in Miller v. National Broadcasting
Co.,159 the court held that a heart attack victim's wife could sue a local television news
producer when a camera crew entered her bedroom along with paramedics. The court
concluded that a valid cause of action existed against the television network and the news
producer for invasion of privacy.160 The court also concluded that reasonable people
could see this intrusion as highly offensive.161 However, in many cases, if the information
disclosed is newsworthy, an individual claiming a right from intrusion onto secret,
secluded, or private information would lose as the disclosure of private facts tort is
balanced against the First Amendment's protection of freedom of the press using a
"newsworthiness" test.162 In such cases, Courts will often strike that balance in favor of
the First Amendment's highly protected freedom of the press.163 Therefore, to the extent
that an individuals facial image captured and posted on the web by a wearable computer
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is newsworthy, the First Amendment may serve as a defense to the publication of the
image.164
The first constitutional challenge of the private facts tort addressed by the
Supreme Court was in Cox Broadcasting Corp v. Cohn.165 Here the Court acknowledged
the need for the right to privacy but noted that the private facts tort "most directly
confronts the constitutional freedoms of speech and press."166 Limiting its decision to the
narrow issue at bar, the Court held that a state may publish a rape victim's identity
obtained from judicial documents that are open to public inspection, provided the
information is accurate.167 By failing to address the broader question of whether the
publication of truthful information could ever be punished, the Cox decision merely
reaffirmed that the private facts tort addresses the disclosure of private, truthful
facts.168 In Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Supreme Court invoked the First Amendment to
find no liability for a newspaper who published the name of a rape victim received from
a police department press release.169 However, the Court expressly rejected the
newspaper's broad claim that the press could never be held liable for publishing the
truth.170 As the Cox case was decided over 30 years ago, the issue a court may have to
decide today is whether a rape victims identity, if paired to the facts of the rape, and
posted on the internet by a person using a wirelessly networked wearable computer,
would result in an invasion of the victim’s privacy. If the court determines that the
164
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information was not newsworthy and consent was not given, it may conclude that under
tort law the individuals privacy had been violated; however, the “newsworthy” test is a
high bar for plaintiffs to overcome.
Prosser's third privacy tort consisted of publicity that placed a person in a false
light.171 The false light tort guards against an objectionable false portrayal of a person.172
Prosser noted two typical false light circumstances: a publisher who uses a person's
picture to illustrate a book or article when that person has no connection with the article,
and a police department which includes a non-convicted person's name, photo, and
fingerprints among a group of convicted criminals.173 Prosser observed that the false light
tort overlapped greatly with defamation.174 Since a video-based wearable computer
system may project false or inaccurate information about an individual, or distort the
video image of a person posted on the internet, such a result may be actionable under the
tort of placing a person in a false light. As discussed in the following sections of the
article critical issues in defining whether a tort is actionable will be the consent or lack
there of, provided by the individual whose image is captured by a wearable computer
system; as well as the status of the person filmed in the public place.
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The fourth privacy tort, “appropriation,” prohibits the unlawful use of a person's
name or identity for a defendant's benefit or advantage.175 This fourth tort of invasion of
privacy differs significantly from the other three torts because appropriation deals with a
proprietary interest as opposed to a personal privacy interest.176 This tort often assists
celebrities in protecting the commercial value of their "right of publicity."177 Of relevance
for video-based wearable computers and privacy, the right of publicity cause of action
was brought forth in a case involving the videotaping of a young woman whose image
appeared in the video titled “Girls Gone Wild- College Girls Exposed.”178 The facts of
the case indicated that while on a public street, the plaintiff was encouraged by a
videographer to remove her clothes and expose areas of her body.179 Some time later, she
discovered that two minutes of footage taken of her appeared in the “Girls Gone WildCollege Girls Exposed” video, and two to three seconds of censored clips of the plaintiff
were being used in television commercials to advertise the videos.180 The plaintiff
brought suit under Florida's statutory version of the right of publicity, section 540.08.181
Section 540.08 of the Florida Statute prohibits the unauthorized publication "for purposes
of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph or
other likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent to such
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use given by such person.182 The defendant, argued its videos were expressive works,
like motion pictures, aiming to entertain,183 and that the documentaries showing real
women in actual public places were entitled to First Amendment protection.184 The court
agreed and found the Girls Gone Wild video to be "irrefutably" an expressive work
created solely to entertain.185
What the above discussion indicates is that there is presently no appropriate cause
of action under tort law for an intrusion into a person’s privacy when they enter a public
place and their image is recorded, analyzed, and uploaded to the internet by an individual
using a wearable computer. However, if broadly defined, the concept of information
privacy may involve an individual's personal information and his ability to control that
information; if so, then the above capabilities of wearable computers represents a
significant means to violate the information privacy rights of an individual once they
have entered a public place.
STATUS OF THE PERSON IN THE PUBLIC PLACE
When considering whether an individual’s privacy in a public place is violated
when their image is filmed by a wearable computer, uploaded to the internet, and paired
to personal information about the individual, the status of the person filmed must be
considered. The consideration of the status of the individual once they enter a public
place is especially important if the defendant in a privacy suit relies on a
“newsworthiness” defense. Generally, those who have achieved a marked reputation or
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notoriety by appearing before the public can expect that their accomplishments and way
of life will be the subject of print, radio, or television attention.186 Therefore, public
figures have to some extent lost the right to privacy in public places and are thus subject
to fair comment and criticism by the media.187 In this regard, the Fifth Circuit has noted
that one of the public interest privileges in reporting private facts is to report truthful facts
concerning public figures.188
The Restatement holds that "one who voluntarily places himself in the public eye,
by engaging in public activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or
activities having general economic, cultural, social or similar public interest, or by
submitting himself or his work for public judgment, cannot complain when he is given
publicity that he has sought, even though it may be unfavorable to him."189 No right of
privacy remains for the public figure in relation to his public activities and appearances
since these are no longer private affairs.190 However, while no cause of action exists
regarding revelations involving the public figure relating to his famous status, liability
may arise when the interest of the public exceeds the range of information that would
otherwise be considered private.191 In fact, one California court has held that public
figures are entitled to keep some information about their domestic activities and sexual
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relations private.192 Further, California's has an anti-paparazzi law that protects a public
figures privacy against journalists who might engage in either physical or constructive
trespasses to obtain images of, as the statute puts it, "personal or familial activities."193
However, the statute does not seem applicable to the use of wirelessly networked
wearable computers that are used to record an individual in a setting other than their
home as it does not cover activities on public streets. The California law reveals a
deficiency in privacy law as it exists today; while it may be permissible to film a public
figure once they enter a public place, in some cases, the publication of personal
information about the individual could result in liability. In the past such actions, the
filming of an individual, and the publication of private facts about an individual occurred
at separate times, therefore, the law could separate the two in regards to privacy, now
with wearable computers, the recording and publication can occur almost simultaneously,
yet no current law accounts for this capability.194
Two early cases that are often quoted have divergent views of the public figure's
relation to the private facts tort. In Melvin v. Reid, the plaintiff was a former prostitute
who had been acquitted of murder.195 Subsequently, Melvin turned her life around and
lived respectably in the private sector for many years in a community that had no
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knowledge of her past.196 However, her history was revealed in a movie about the
murder case that used her actual maiden name.197 The court held that the creation of the
movie violated her right to privacy because she had successfully reclaimed her private
figure status.198 The use of wearable computers with facial recognition capabilities could
make it much more difficult for an individual to reclaim their private life once they had
left the limelight as numerous “watching eyes” could be ever vigilant once they were
programmed to search for particular individuals. However, in a case showing the law in
this area is unsettled, the Second Circuit determined in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., that
a reclusive former child prodigy who had hidden from the media for years was not a
private figure.199 Sidis sued The New Yorker magazine after he was featured and mocked
in a "where is he now" article, but the court held that his public figure status had not
diminished with the passing of time.200 In contrast to the Melvin decision,201 the Sidis
decision seems to stand for the premise that at some point the public interest in obtaining
information becomes dominant over the individual's desire for privacy.202
Involuntary public figures, are persons who have not sought public attention but
who have become "news" as the result of their involvement in or association with an
otherwise newsworthy event.203 This category includes crime victims, accident victims,
accused criminals, and people who perform heroic acts.204 Additionally, those who are
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related to voluntary public figures gain involuntary public figure status.205 The Seventh
Circuit opined that involuntary public figures have no legal right to regain their private
status as long as the newsworthy events that made them public figures remain in the
public interest.206 The court noted that even if these people do not desire publicity and
would prefer that their experiences remain private, they are not equipped with the legal
means to do so.207 However, in Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co, the Third Circuit remarked
that the invasion of privacy rights of involuntary public figures is not without limits.208
The case concerned a young girl who had been involved in a car accident at age ten and
had the misfortune of being photographed at that time.209 At a later date, another
magazine published the picture from the accident and the victim sued for invasion of
privacy.210 Although ultimately finding for the publishers, the court declared that the
plaintiff's life may not be subjected to continuous public scrutiny and would only risk
attention in situations closely related to the initial car accident.211
Another type of figure that may be found in a public place are private figures; this
category represents the vast majority of people who could be filmed by a wearable
computer once they entered a public place. While intuitively, private figures should have
a greater expectation of privacy than public figures, most jurisdictions do not consider the
status of the plaintiff in determining newsworthiness. The Supreme Court has stated, in
dicta, that the risk of exposure to public view is an "essential incident of life in a society
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press," so even private
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citizens' rights of privacy are difficult to protect.212 Arguably, the tendency of the courts
to favor the press over individuals, coupled with privacy-seeking people's reluctance to
broadcast their private facts in court, has prevented the full development of the private
facts tort.213 To this end, when the plaintiff in a private facts tort is a private figure, the
"right to be let alone" must still be balanced against the public interest in the
dissemination of news and information, as well as the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press.214
The right of privacy's main objective is to protect private life, and it is determined
by a reasonable person standard.215 In other words, an allegedly objectionable
publication must offend an "ordinary man."216 This standard for private citizens in public
places, rather than the standard for public figures that seek and enjoy publicity, arguably
assists the protection of private citizens who desire to be left alone.217 As noted
previously, once an individual enters a public place, they do not expect to also enter
cyberspace where vast online databases can be searched to discover personal information
about the individual. In addition to the apparent benefits to private figures' privacy, the
reasonable person standard has the practical advantage of limiting the amount of
frivolous and extraneous information that can be reported about them; that is, things done
or said by public figures are more likely to serve the public in an educational or
newsworthy way than those said or done by private figures.218 Much of the above
discussion concerning the status of an individual entering public places centered on the
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press’s right to publish newsworthy information. Therefore, in the context of networked
wearable computers, the courts will have to determine the extent to which recordings of
individuals in public places constitutes news; if the image constitutes news, then the
newsworthy event will trump an individuals right to privacy in a public place.
FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW AND PRIVACY
The Fourth Amendment has been the main source of protection for an individual’s
privacy when a government actor is involved. The following section reviews Fourth
Amendment search and seizure law in the context of privacy in public places. In the early
twentieth century, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was geared
toward the protection of property.219 The Court's inclination to protect property quite
clearly is reflected in its 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States.220 In Olmstead, the
Supreme Court held that use of a wiretap to intercept a private telephone conversation
was not a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.221 One of the grounds on
which the Court justified its result was that there had been no physical intrusion into the
person's home.222 Under Olmstead's narrow view of the Fourth Amendment, the
amendment was not applicable in the absence of physical intrusion, i.e., not applicable to
public places.223 Thus, without trespass or seizure of any material object, surveillance
was beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the Olmstead Court.
However, in its well-known decision in Katz v. United States, decided 39 years
after Olmstead, the Supreme Court rejected Olmstead's "trespass" doctrine, articulating,
in its place, a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based on the protection of individual
219
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privacy.224 In Katz, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protected people, not
places: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."225
Thus, the Court held that physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is not
necessary before a search and seizure can be held to violate the Fourth Amendment.
According to the Court in Katz, "once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protects people-and not simply "areas"- against unreasonable searches and seizures it
becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."226
Changing technology precipitated the shift from protection of property to
protection of privacy, and in 1968, just one year after Katz, Congress passed Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act authorizing microphone surveillance or
wiretapping for law enforcement purposes, and requiring a warrant based on probable
cause, prior to such surveillance or wiretapping.227 Specifically, Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act as enacted regulated the interception of electronic,
wire, and oral communication, but not video surveillance.228 However, as federal courts
have stated,229 "video surveillance is more invasive of privacy than audio surveillance,
'just as a strip search is more invasive than a pat-down search'"; but Congress has not
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made this distinction.230 Therefore, there seems to be a deficiency in the law because
video surveillance is unregulated by Title III, even though video is arguably more
intrusive than aural (audio) surveillance.231
The use of video surveillance itself in the context of search and seizure law has
been considered by different jurisdictions. The Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. Torres,232 declined
to hold that video surveillance was unconstitutional per se under the Federal
Constitution's Fourth Amendment, and, more specifically, rejected the proposition that
secretly videotaping in private places could never be considered reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. It was not meant to suggest, the court cautioned, that the Fourth
Amendment was to be interpreted as allowing such surveillance to be used as generally as
less intrusive techniques. A search could be unreasonable, though conducted under an
otherwise valid warrant, the Court stated, if the search intruded on personal privacy to an
extent disproportionate to the likely benefits from obtaining fuller compliance with the
law.233 Further, it was noted by the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Taketa,234 that video
surveillance did not, in itself, violate a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of
the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment. And while expressing concern over the
high degree of intrusiveness that was inherent in video surveillance, the court in People v.
Teicher,235 held that such surveillance was not per se unreasonable under the Federal
Constitution's Fourth Amendment so as to require its prohibition in all circumstances.
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Close scrutiny must be given to any application for a warrant permitting video
surveillance, the court stated, but the Fourth Amendment did not mandate an absolute ban
on such surveillance any more than it did with electronic eavesdropping.236 It was also
held in State v. Clemmons237 that video surveillance as a method of investigation did not
in itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Federal Constitution's
Fourth Amendment, as the police could record what they could view with their naked
eyes. Even though wearable computers can record and also analyze facial images, courts
would likely hold that the analysis of a person’s face using facial recognition software, if
done in a public place, is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, as under Clemmons,
all that would be recorded and analyzed is the same as what can be analyzed with the
naked eyes. However, if the facial image was uploaded to the internet and paired with
personal information, this change in facts may be sufficient for a court to find a violation
of an individual’s privacy.
A wearable computer system may contain sensors such as cameras, microphones,
infrared and thermal heat sensors.238 Would the information derived from the sensors
constitute a search if performed by a government actor? In Kyllo v. U.S. the question
considered by the Court was whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home
constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.239 The scan of
Kyllo's home showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner's home
were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than
236

Id.
State v. Clemmons, 81 Wash. App. 1003, 1996 WL 146721 (Div. 1 1996).
238
Jim Garamone, Army Tests Land Warrior for 21st Century Soldiers, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep1998/n09111998_9809117.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
239
Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
237

47
neighboring homes. The Court concluded that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," constituted a
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.240
On the basis of this criterion, the Court concluded that the information obtained by the
thermal imager in this case was the product of a search.241 Therefore, when the
”Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a "search" and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”242
However, given the predicted increased usage of wearable computers, equipped with
sense enhancing technology, they may become sufficiently mainstream technology so as
not to constitute a search in Fourth Amendment terms; especially if used to record what is
in plain sight or brought to the public.243
Although no court has ruled on the constitutionality of using wearable computers
for purposes of surveillance by a government actor, the Katz doctrine leads to the nearly
inevitable conclusion that the use of this technology - provided it occurs in a public place
- is not a search.244 In order to find that surveillance of individuals in a public place is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court would have to reconsider one of
the central aspects of the Katz doctrine - that a person is only protected if she enjoys a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her actions. When this standard is applied to activity
240
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in the public sphere, it is hard to conclude that the Fourth Amendment is implicated.
Therefore, government actors using wearable computers may not be in violation of the
Fourth Amendment when filming individuals in public places. In contrast, the courts have
determined that the search if performed in a person’s home and done by the media
accompanying the police, does implicate the Fourth Amendment. For example, in
“Reality TV” filming where the media accompanies law enforcement personnel in some
variation of a "ride-along," if the media uses a video camera to record the police arrest
and crime scene, the Fourth Amendment may be violated even if the individual is filmed
in their own home.245 On point is Wilson v. Layne,246 where the Supreme Court held that
media ride-alongs violated the Fourth Amendment when the media accompanied law
enforcement officers into the person’s home.247
VI.

VIDEO VOYEURISM
This section of the article focuses on the use of wirelessly networked phone

cameras in the context of video voyeurism, an emerging area of concern for invasion of
individual’s privacy in public places. Of interest to this article is that facial recognition
software has been integrated into some phone cameras,248 and that research is underway
using Bluetooth-enabled camera cell phones that would record where the caller is, what
time they called, and who they are with.249 This later technology, which is being
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developed at the University of California, Berkeley, in conjunction with Yahoo, is based
on a central server that registers details sent by a cell phone when a photo is taken.250
These include the nearest cell phone mast, the strength of the call signal and the time the
photo was taken. The system also identifies other Bluetooth-enabled cell phones within
range of the photographer and combines this with time and place information to create a
shortlist of people who might be in the picture. This information can then be combined
with facial-recognition software to identify the subjects from the shortlist, and to track the
location of people. According to Professor Davis, a lead investigator on the project, facial
recognition software on its own can only identify people with 43 per cent accuracy from
the grainy shots taken by camera phones, but by combining facial recognition systems
with context information the system may then correctly identify people 60 per cent of the
time.251 The context information can also be combined with image-recognition software
to identify places within photos.252 What this example illustrates is that wearable
computer technology is converging such that it can not only record and analyze an
individual’s facial image but also track the individual in public places. The combination
of these technologies may pose a significant threat to an individual’s information privacy
rights in public places. If we consider personal information to include where you are, who
you are with, and what time you are there, especially if paired to other personal
information about an individual that is searchable on the internet, this combination of
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information may result in almost no privacy for any individual once they leave their
house.
An important question that must be addressed in the area of privacy rights
resulting from wearable computers equipped with facial recognition software, especially
if personal information is paired to the facial image, is the appropriate cause of action to
pursue by the aggrieved party. In some states, when a video camera is used to record an
individual in an area where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, an action
may be brought forth under a video voyeurism statute;253 in other states there may be a
right to privacy afforded in the state constitution.254 For example, California, Alaska, and
Hawaii255 as well as other states, include a right to privacy in their respective state
constitutions. And as noted in a previous section of this article, if the party doing the
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filming is a government actor, the Fourth Amendment provides some, but limited,
protection to individuals filmed in public places.256
Recent cases in video voyeurism dealing with the video taping and subsequent use
of an individual’s image without permission may provide some direction to the type of
actions that may be pursued by a person filmed without permission by an individual with
a wearable computer equipped with facial recognition software. Video voyeurism
generally occurs when a person secretly films another person in an area where that person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and has not consented to the observation.257
Camera phones with wireless internet capabilities have been reported to be a voyeur's
dream-come-true, pictures and even video can be shot "discreetly" and immediately
emailed or uploaded to the internet.258 Some victims of video voyeurism have sought
relief through the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.259 A court may
hold a voyeur liable for causing severe emotional distress to a victim if the plaintiff can
prove that the voyeur engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct and acted either
intentionally or recklessly.260 Although some claims have been successful under this tort
action,261 a plaintiff seeking relief from an unwanted picture may nevertheless find it
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difficult to convince a trier of fact that an indecent photo of herself in the hands of only
one voyeur has caused severe emotional distress. However, with wirelessly networked
technology such as a cell phone or video-based wearable computer, an image may be
almost instantaneously posted on the internet, so far more than one individual may view
the image, and indeed voyeurs often post the images to web sites frequented by other
voyeurs.
In terms of additional causes of action, plaintiffs in video voyeurism cases have
looked at Federal and state wiretapping statutes, but for the most part found them to be
ineffective.262 These statutes impose liability for unauthorized audio communications, but
not the recording of a video image.263 A few courts have, however, broadly interpreted
"communication" within state statutes to include any exchange of thoughts, messages or
information by a means other than spoken words.264 On the other hand, federal courts
have yet to include silent video recordings within the Electronic Communications Privacy
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Act.265 Therefore, video voyeurs can escape liability under wiretapping statutes by either
photographing the victims or videotaping them without using sound.266
To address the problem of cell phone video voyeurism, a recent bill signed into
federal law267 was enacted to ban the use of camera-equipped phones when used to
photograph or videotape a disrobed person without his or her consent in any place where
there can be "a reasonable expectation of privacy." The key language of the Federal
statute is:
“Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
has the intent to capture an image of a private area of an individual without their
consent, and knowingly does so under circumstances in which the individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.” Title 18 § 1801.
Some terminology and definitions in the Federal Video Voyeurism statute have
relevance for a statute which would address information privacy violations involving a
265
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wirelessly networked video-based wearable computer. For example, as described in the
statute, to `capture' an image means to videotape, photograph, film, record by any means,
or broadcast; whereas; `broadcast' means to electronically transmit a visual image with
the intent such that it be viewed by a person or persons.268 However, a key term under the
Federal Video Voyeurism Statute- `under circumstances in which that individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy' would need to be modified to accommodate
information privacy in public places. Regarding an information privacy statute, a
‘reasonable expectation of information privacy’ would need to be designed to protect a
persons privacy who had entered a public place, was filmed by a wearable computer, and
had their image posted on the internet along with personal information.
A growing number of states have also enacting legislation to address the problem
of video voyeurism.269 For example, New York State enacted legislation termed
“Stephanie’s Law” that creates criminal penalties for acts of video voyeurism.270
Specifically, Stephanie's Law creates criminal penalties for those who would use a
mechanical, digital or electronic device to capture visual images of another person in a
place where that person had a reasonable expectation of privacy and had not given his or
her consent.271 Stephanie’s law also creates criminal penalties for those who disseminate,
publish, or sell images of the intimate parts of another person's body. The legislation
requires that a video voyeur who is caught using or installing a camera for sexual
purposes, or in a bedroom, bathroom, or other specified rooms, would be subject to
268
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presumptive registration with the State's Sex Offender Registry. Under Stephanie’s law,
a person with a wearable computer filming the intimate parts of another, would be liable
just as would any other voyeur using video equipment.
In New York, there is also a General Business Law statute that forbids an "owner
or manager" of a premise to knowingly permit or allow a viewing device to be installed
or maintained in such premise for the purpose of surreptitiously observing, or recording a
visual image in, the interior of "any fitting room, restroom, toilet, bathroom, washroom,
shower, or any room assigned to guests or patrons in a motel, hotel or inn."272 Under such
a law, would the proprietor of the premise be required to ask an individual equipped with
a video-based wearable computer to leave the premise? The proscribed act is a violation
if the conduct is limited to "observing"; it is a felony if the conduct is "recording."273 The
General Business Law applies only to the "owner or manager" of the premise, and the
General Business Law prohibition does not apply to a "private dwelling" or to certain
other locations which are covered by the Penal Law crimes.274
In video voyeurism, the place and time when a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, is an important aspect of video voyeurism statutes and may turn
out to be the one most litigated. The notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy is also
central to the intrusion into a person’s privacy in a public place if one is considering the
concept of information privacy. The “reasonable person” definition in video voyeurism
statutes borrows the terminology from Fourth Amendment’s "reasonable expectation of
privacy" case law.275 A "reasonable expectation of privacy" reflects whether the person
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viewed has a subjective expectation of privacy at the time and place of the viewing, and
if so, whether from an objective standpoint it is an expectation that accords with societal
conventions. This article argues that personal information disseminated on the internet
and paired to a person’s image would diverge from societal expectations of what privacy
a reasonable person should expect when they enter a public place; and thus should be
actionable.
Permitting one's self to be filmed with knowledge that you are being viewed is a
form of implied consent. Therefore, there would be no "expectation of privacy" under an
information privacy statute in knowingly exposing oneself to a person with a video-based
wearable computer. Here the concept of physically exposing yourself to being filmed
versus exposing an individual’s personal information when they enter a public place
differs. While an individual may knowingly expose their image to the public once they
enter a public place, they do not knowingly or purposively expose personal information
about themselves when they enter a public place; the personal records of their affairs are
expected to be kept private and “at home.” Based on Prosser’s analysis of tort law, the
image recorded by the video-based wearable computer in a public place may be
considered public information. However, personal and private facts associated with the
image, especially if posted on the internet would be considered personal, and nonpublic
information. Essentially, with video-based wearable computer technology, once a person
enters a public place, they may also unknowingly be entering cyberspace as their image
may be recorded, analyzed, and uploaded to the internet. The law as currently developed,
offers some privacy protection for cyberspace transactions on the internet, but does not
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consider the combination of public and cyberspace privacy in the age of wirelessly
wearable computers.
The video voyeurism statutes enacted in some states have already resulted in
prosecution, and such prosecution may be illustrative for disputes that may involve
wearable computers and privacy. The road toward the Federal video voyeurism law
began with two state cases, one in Louisiana and one in Washington State; in both, video
technology was used to violate an individual’s privacy. In the first case, Susan and Gary
Wilson of Monroe, Louisiana discovered that a neighbor had installed hidden cameras in
the Wilson’s master bedroom and bathroom.276 To the Wilson’s surprise, Louisiana
authorities said their neighbor's actions were not criminal offenses under current state and
federal law. After the Wilson’s learned their neighbor had similarly victimized others in
the community, the couple urged their state representatives to change the law. In 1999,
the Louisiana governor signed a bill making video voyeurism a felony.277
The second case which influenced Federal law makers occurred in Washington
State, where Richard Sorrells secretly aimed a video camera up a woman's skirt as she
waited at an ice cream stand during a festival in 2000.278 The Washington State Supreme
Court ruled that filming up women's skirts, though "disgusting and reprehensible," wasn't
in violation of current state law.279 It overturned the convictions of Sorrells and another
man, Glas, who was accused of taking photographs under women's skirts at a shopping
mall. In response to the outcome of these cases, in 2002, Washington state lawmakers
changed the law to give legal recourse to people whose privacy was violated in public.
276
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The new law was used to prosecute Jack Le Vu, the first known cell phone camera
voyeur to be convicted in the United States.280 In 2003, Vu was seen in a Seattle area
Safeway using a cell phone camera to covertly snap pictures beneath the skirt of a woman
shopping next to him. Under the revamped Washington privacy law, Vu was successfully
prosecuted and later pleaded guilty to one count of voyeurism.281 He was sentenced to 60
days jail time and forced to register as a sex offender.282
VII.

REALITY FILMING, STILL PHOTOGRAPHS AND PRIVACY
“Reality filming” and the use of photographs of individuals taken in public places

are both areas where there have been disputes involving alleged invasions of privacy.
Some aspects of the cases in these areas have “voyeuristic” components, and thus relate
to the previous material in this article; however, each area brings up some new issues not
covered in the previous section. Americans have long been fascinated with the personal
affairs of other people, Warren and Brandeis spoke of this in their 1980’s article.283
More recently, in the 1990’s an abundance of "reality" television shows which focused on
the private lives of individuals appeared, including: COPS, I-Witness Video, Firefighters,
Real Stories of the Highway Patrol, Emergency Response, and Rescue 911.284 For
example, in the United States, camera crews often follow police and emergency
personnel as well as use video surveillance cameras mounted on poles and buildings in
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order to film individuals without their permission.285 Such programs highlight the
extremely personal information that reality television may reveal about an individual, just
as can video-based wearable computers.286 For example, in the mid 1990’s Langley
Productions marketed a "too hot" for television version of COPS that the "censors would
not let you see."287 The most graphic portions of the video showed a man who hung
himself in his garage, a drive-by shooting victim dying in a car, a man running from his
house on fire and the deceased bodies of an entire family including a baby in a
crib.288 Another "reality" show placed a hidden microphone on a paramedic who aided a
critically injured woman who could be heard begging for her life.289 Moreover, news
tabloid shows and other news programs constantly use hidden cameras and microphones
to expose the personal details of an individuals life.290 One commentator concluded that
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it seems that the voyeurism market has advanced to the point where cameras are so
widespread, that people in public places are left with little, if any, privacy.291
However, even given the extreme graphic content of the above examples, the law
may under limited circumstances provide protection for a person’s privacy when they
have been filmed in a public place. For example, in one case a plaintiff was able to
recover for a photograph taken of her in public when an air jet blew her skirt over her
head.292 The photographer sold the picture of the woman in her underwear to a
newspaper which published the photograph on the front page of its paper.293 An
important distinction made by the court was that the intrusion into privacy occurred the
moment the photograph was taken, not when the photograph was published.294 The use
of wearable computers by individuals in public places may easily result in similar
recordings of an individual in a compromising position, and thus based on the above
decision, may violate the person’s privacy at the moment of filming. In another case
limiting the right to film an individual in a public place, the California Supreme Court in
1998 ruled against the producers of On Scene: Emergency Response for videotaping
conversations between a car-accident victim and a nurse on a medical evacuation
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helicopter.295 The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled in 1999 that police may have violated
the privacy rights of citizens by allowing Washington Post reporters to tag along when
they questioned the parents of a criminal suspect in their home.296 While the crash scene
itself was newsworthy and exempt from suit, the court ruled, the victim had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the helicopter.297
But in most cases when a person has been filmed in a public place, the plaintiff’s
privacy claim fails especially, if as noted previously, the defendant is able to successfully
use a “newsworthy” defense. For example, a couple tried to sue the publisher of “World
Guide to Nude Beaches and Recreation” after he published a photograph of them on a
nude beach.298 The Appellate Court in New York held that the matter was of some public
interest, and the couple's picture was reasonably related to the subject; therefore, the
couple was not allowed to recover.299 In another case, Jones v. Herald Post Co.,300 the
plaintiff brought an action for the invasion of her privacy as a result of the publication of
a picture that related to the death or her husband. The court, in denying the right of the
plaintiff to recover, stated in part as follows: "The right of privacy may be defined as the
right to live one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired
publicity. In short, it is the right to be let alone.”301 There are times, however, when one,
whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest,
when this takes place, he emerges from his seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right
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of privacy to publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence.302 In a similar
case, a Georgia newspaper published photographs of a murdered fourteen-year-old girl
whose body was partially decomposed and wrapped in chains.303 A Georgia court held
that the girls body was newsworthy and the girl's family could not maintain a cause of
action.304 In a particularly egregious case which involved the newsworthiness of the
story versus the privacy rights of the plaintiff, a woman's former husband kidnapped her,
took her to an apartment, and stripped and raped her.305 The police arrived with camera
crews, and although the woman attempted to cover herself with a dish towel, her
photograph was published the next day in a newspaper.306 A Florida court seeming to
conclude that voyeurism was a protected right, denied the woman damages, and held that
the event was a newsworthy, emotion-packed drama to which others are attracted.307
Based on the above court decisions, the courts take a liberal view as to what captures the
publics interest; and if the court finds that the recorded incident is a matter of public
interest, or matter of a public investigation, a publication in connection therewith will in
most jurisdictions not constitute a violation of one's legal right of privacy.
A few additional issues of relevance for video-based wearable computers is
whether the recorded image is used for a commercial or noncommercial use, and whether
the recorded image is used for a political or nonpolitical use. In a dispute involving the
use of a photograph without permission, a multi-million dollar lawsuit was filed against a
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political activists group and a political consulting firm for allegedly stealing a gay
couple’s wedding photo and using it in a political ad.308 The suit alleged numerous
complaints- that the use of the couple’s image without permission constituted an invasion
of privacy, was libelous, placed them in a false light, violated their right of publicity, and
constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress.309 This particular case
illustrates how the facts surrounding the case influence the direction of the litigation. To
wit, when pictures and video are used in political ads, they are treated as fully protected
speech under the First Amendment, and not as the less protected "commercial speech."310
Moreover, when the claim involves speech on matters of public concern, courts generally
reject the claim on First Amendment grounds.311 This discussion suggests that to the
extent an image recorded by a wearable computer is used for a purpose protected by the
First Amendment, such as political speech, it may not violate a person’s privacy.
The case of Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC,312 presented earlier in this article is
representative of a recent trend in reality filming. The dispute involved the use of an
image in a “Girls Gone Wild” commercials and video. The plaintiff argued that the use of
the video in the film was not expected because she was told while being filmed by the
cameraman that he was intending to make a film for his own personal use. According to
the plaintiff, Lane, the cameraman represented to her that he would not show the video to
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anyone who was not present at that time.313 The first three counts of Lane's claims were
brought under Florida law against MRA for unauthorized publication in violation of
common law invasion of privacy for commercial misappropriation of likeness and false
light invasion of privacy.314 Under Florida law, the elements of common law invasion of
privacy for commercial misappropriation of likeness, coincide with the elements of
unauthorized publication of a name or likeness in violation of Fla. Stat. § 540.08.315
MRA argued that Fla. Stat. § 540.08 absorbed the common law claim of invasion of
privacy based upon a commercial misappropriation of likeness. However, section 6 of
Fla. Stat. § 540.08 provides that the "remedies provided for in this section shall be in
addition to, and not in limitation of the remedies and rights of any person under the
common law against the invasion of her or his privacy."316
Lane also asserted a claim against MRA for false light invasion of privacy.
According to Lane, MRA's juxtaposition of her with other women exposing their genital
areas, or engaging in extended topless and suggestive dancing portrayed her in a false
light. The two essential elements for recovery under false light invasion of privacy are:
(1) the false light must be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (2) the defendant
must have acted either knowingly or in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized material and the false light in which it would be placed.317 With regards to the
first element the court concluded that although a reasonable jury could conclude that the
313
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use of Lane's image and likeness in a video containing women exposing themselves is
highly offensive, no reasonable jury could conclude that Girls Gone Wild or its marketing
campaign with Sexy Sorority Sweethearts placed Lane in a false light.318 Foremost, the
court reasoned that in the video, Lane is depicted truthfully and accurately as doing
exactly what she did, exposing her breasts on a street in Panama City in exchange for a
beaded necklace.319 Moreover, the court concluded, considering the nature of Lane's
actions, the publication of her image in a video containing other women engaging in
similar acts was neither unreasonable nor inaccurate.320 Altogether, MRA's juxtaposition
of Lane with other women exposing themselves cannot give rise to the tort of false light
invasion of privacy because the depiction of Lane was reasonable, accurate, and
truthful.321 The court reasoned that if the publicity is an accurate portrayal of the public
display, if the publicity is not unreasonable and false, then Lane has no actionable privacy
interest, even if the publicity has caused embarrassment, offense, or damage.322
VI.

TOWARDS AN INFORMATION PRIVACY STATUTE
As shown above, current law dealing with video recordings in public places is

represented by a patchwork of statutes and common law causes of action, with no
specific law covering the capability of wearable computers to invade an individual’s
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privacy in a public place.323 While in the past, a person who entered a public place was
said to place themselves under the general scrutiny of the public’s eyes, the public’s
ability to know personal information about an individual was limited to what their naked
eyes could discern. However, networked wearable computers with facial recognition
software has changed this basic premise; if an individual’s image can be identified and
uploaded to the internet, a tremendous amount of personal information can be known and
paired to a particular individual. Now days, a person entering public space, may
unknowingly be entering cyberspace; yet the law on privacy has not adapted to this
reality. In this regard, Professor Froomkin observed that as a result of modern
surveillance technology, there was an erosion of the border separating the private from
the public spheres.324 This article argues that in an age of wirelessly networked and
video-based wearable computers, legislatures should enact a statute which would protect
the information privacy rights of individuals in public places.325
The right to information privacy as advocated in this article and by legal
scholars,326 is not a new concept, in fact it was addressed by the U. S. Supreme Court in
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Whalen v. Roe almost 30 years ago.327 The Whalen case involved the invasion of
patients' privacy by a New York statute requiring physicians to submit copies of
prescriptions for abused drugs to the state for inclusion in a centralized computer file.328
While the Court upheld the statute, finding that New York's interest in experimenting
with solutions to control the distribution of dangerous drugs was a legitimate exercise of
the state's police power; still the Court affirmed the right of an individual to have his
personal information kept private.329 The court stated:
A final word about issues we have not decided. We are not unaware of the threat
to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files. The collection of
taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of
public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the
criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of
information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing
or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes
is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures.330
Later, in 1989, the Supreme Court described the right to privacy as encompassing
"the individual's control of information concerning his or her person."331 More recently,
Professor Kang adopted the Supreme Courts description of information privacy in his call
for an “Information Privacy Act,” describing information privacy as an individual's
personal information and his ability to control that information.332 As an extension to this
concept, it has been argued that information privacy should include more than just control
over personal information, but should also include information that expresses one’s
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identity; for example, information that can be used to place individuals into categories.333
Karas noted that under such an approach, when determining whether a privacy violation
had occurred, “a court would consider whether one’s privacy as a consumer, a sexual
being, a father, etc. had been invaded by a particular practice.”334 This idea seems to be
compatible with the Fourth Amendment’s case law discussing the “standard of a
reasonable person” to determine if an individual should have an expectation of privacy in
a public place.335 However, under Karas’s view, the standard of a reasonable person
within a particular category would have to be determined, as would the number and type
of categories; such an approach may be unworkable unless the categories were limited
and the procedure for identifying individuals within a category were clear and easily
determined.
As discussed in this article, given the capabilities of wirelessly networked videobased wearable computers with facial recognition software, and tracking technologies,
much personal information about an individual can be known and paired to an
individual’s image. On this point, one need not be concerned with just the capability of
wearable computers to track individuals and invade their privacy, as Professor Schwartz
has outlined, implantable chip technology can also be used to track a person and collect
extensive and continuous personal data about them.336 Given the ability to track an
individual, a particular type of wearable computer, those with opaque or see-through
displays, may result in an even greater invasion of a person’s privacy than filming an
individual and uploading their image to the internet. Wearable computers with opaque or
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see-through displays may allow personal information to be directly “pasted” on an
individual’s image as they move around public places.337 What is troublesome about such
technology is that the ability to track a person’s movements and to pair personal
information to an individual based on where they are at a given time, may provide useful
information to stalkers, pedophiles, and other criminals. Stalkers have been known to use
video cameras to monitor their victims movements, which is often a precursor to a violent
crime.338 On this point, some states have included language in their stalking statute
which specifically mentions surveillance as an act of stalking.339 Further, pedophiles
often like to know the location and identity of kids as kids move around public places in
order to alert other pedophiles. The law on tracking individuals is unsettled, while an
individual may not stalk a person, a Federal circuit has held that it is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment for the police to place a GPS unit on a suspect’s car; in contrast, a
New York State court ruled that such an act is a search.340
In an age of wearable computers, based on privacy and safety concerns, there
needs to be a comprehensive federal policy guaranteeing an individual the right to control
the collection and distribution of their personal information once they enter a public
place. Such a statue should include the ability to control the dissemination of location
data and whether an individual’s image may be filmed, analyzed, and uploaded to the
337
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internet. While these last categories of information- location data, and the video recording
and identification of an individual’s image, are normally not considered under the rubric
of personal information- we have now entered a technological age where the identity of a
person and their location are considered highly sought after information by marketers341
and others who may use such information for nefarious reasons- thus the law ought to
consider whether such information should be regulated.
If a statute were to be enacted to protect an individuals information privacy rights
in a public place, what would be the basic components of such a statute? In the context
of information privacy, Kang discussed personal information as “information identifiable
to the individual.”342 He also indicated that “personal” in the context of information did
not necessarily mean sensitive, private, or embarrassing information, but that it described
a relationship between the information and a person, i.e., information “identifiable to an
individual.”343 Kang also specifically stated that biometric data constituted personal
information about an individual.344 Clearly, facial recognition software implemented into
a wearable computer performs a biometric analysis of a person’s face, and thus
constitutes personal information under Kang’s reasoning- and thus would warrant
protection under a privacy law statute. In addition, borrowing from Fourth Amendment
case law and Federal and state video voyeurism statutes,345 an information privacy law
should be designed to protect an individual’s “reasonable expectation of information
privacy” once they enter a public place. While it may be reasonable to expect to be seen
341
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and identified in a public place by individuals who may directly view you, it is
unreasonable to expect that you will be filmed, that your recorded image will be uploaded
to the internet, and that personal information will be paired to your identity and location.
As one aspect of privacy protection in a public place, personal information which may
violate a persons privacy if posted on the internet, in a similar manner should also violate
a person’s information privacy if paired to their image once they entered a public place.
This type of information would include not only social security numbers, and medical
records, but as noted above, information which could be used to track an individuals
movements within public places.
Professor Kang also distinguished between the concepts of “surveillance” and
“casual observations,” arguing that a law too general might constrain causal observations
made in public places, therefore Kang limited his proposed “Information Privacy Act” to
cyberspace transactions.346 As emphasized in this article, video-based wearable
computers equipped with facial recognition software and internet capabilities may be
used to pair personal information to an individual’s image once they enter a public place.
Given the capabilities of wirelessly networked wearable computers; an information
privacy statute that focused solely on transactions in cyberspace would be too limited in
scope to account for the realities of current wearable computing and internet technology.
It is the combination of an image being recorded in a public place and having the image
paired to information derived from the internet as well as tracking information that must
be accounted for in an information privacy statute directed at wearable computers.
A comprehensive information privacy statute should provide for an enforcement
mechanism which would establish sanctions against violators and offer redress for
346
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aggrieved individuals. Most effective would be legislation providing a private right cause
of action for aggrieved individuals. Further, the statute should be designed to include an
exemption for law enforcement who may need to use wearable computer technology to
identify individuals and track their movements.347 And individuals with wearable
computers that desire to film individuals in public places, should in some way provide a
warning to individuals that they are being filmed, especially if the wearable computer has
internet capabilities and the individuals image may be uploaded to the internet. Here the
law would need to distinguish between what one would consider “background
characters” in the video versus the subject of the filming. It would be onerous and
unworkable to expect an individual to warn every potential person captured within the
field of view of a camera lens that they were being filmed. In lieu of personally
contacting each individual, perhaps the wearable computer itself could effect a warning,
possibly in the form of an “on light” to indicate the individual was filming. A statute to
account for the capabilities of wearable computers may also be written such that those
individuals whose image is analyzed by facial recognition software must provide consent
to being filmed in a public place if their image will be uploaded to the internet. Along
these lines, given the reported benefits of wearable computers, for example, monitoring a
person’s medical status or identifying the location of one’s kids, a person should have the
ability to “opt in” and decide which personal information should be collected and who
should be able to view it.348 If a person does “opt in” for certain applications, the
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information privacy statute should prohibit the interception and use of the wireless signal
by a third party for uses that violates an individual’s information privacy.
In summary, the basic components of an information privacy statute designed to
account for the capabilities of wearable computer technology should address the ability to
analyze and recognize faces, post facial images on the internet, pair personal information
to the posted image, and track an individual’s movements in a public place.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS
We live in a society where there is a shrinking level or personal privacy. For

example, for a small price, one can purchase a month's worth of call information for just
about anyone.349 These are very personal and private records of who an individual calls,
when the call was made, and how long was spent on the telephone call. Similar levels of
detailed private information can be accessed on the internet for either a small fee or for
free. Even with such intrusive practices, wearable computers may result in an even
greater loss of personal privacy than has occurred from use of the internet.350 Therefore,
legislatures should address the privacy concerns that result from wearable computers,
before the wearable computer technology develops even further to monitor and track
individuals in public places.
It should be noted that whether the use of technology which can record images
and upload them to the internet, such as cell phones and video-based wearable computers,
are desirable technology for a particular community is not only a question of law but also
349
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a question of public policy. In that regard, in response to the growing use of cell phones
images used for voyeuristic purposes, in West Lothian, Scotland, camera phones are
banned at all secondary and primary schools to insure the safety and security of pupils.351
The policy has been supported by the local teachers' association which fears that video
images could be misused by pedophiles.352 While completing banning a technology at a
school may be an appropriate means to solve a societal problem at a local level, in the
case of wirelessly networked wearable computers a more comprehensive solution is
called for, due to both privacy and safety concerns.
When considering privacy in public places, the Fourth Amendment provides
protection of individuals in public places only where they have a reasonable expectation
of privacy from government intrusion. What happens when the filming of an individual in
a public place is done by a private actor? In this case, the main causes of action stem
from the classic article on privacy published by Warren and Brandeis in 1890353 and
enumerated specifically in the 1960 article by Prosser.354 Both articles, and the case law
presented in this article, highlight the fact that a central feature of privacy, is the notion of
having a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a particular space occupied by a person.
However, as many of the cases presented in this article emphasized, once a person places
themselves “in public,” much of their expectations for privacy disappear. One can ask, is
this result still reasonable in an age of wirelessly networked wearable computers
equipped with facial recognitions software? While the Supreme Court has stood steadfast
to the notion of privacy in a public place depending on a rather restricted view of what
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constitutes a reasonable expectation or privacy, the Federal and many State governments
in enacting stricter privacy laws, and enacting new legislature to punish video voyeurism,
have indicated a wiliness to expand the range of what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy in order to keep pace with technology developments. What is
needed now is an ever greater expansion of the notion of what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy in public spaces. Currently, there are numerous bills being debated
at the state and federal level, on just this topic.355 Therefore, while the future may be
leading to a world where technology will be able to monitor, record, and analyze our
every movement in public spaces, it is expected that laws will be enacted to provide some
privacy protection, not only from government actors, but public actors as well, hopefully
such laws will provide more protection for privacy in public places,356 and will focus on
the capabilities of wirelessly networked wearable computers equipped with facial
recognition software and other sensors.
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